

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. XI, NO. 282

NOVEMBER 19, 1944

## *In this issue*

### THE ALLIED BLOCKADE

*Article by John V. Lovitt*

### CONFERENCE OF ALLIED MINISTERS OF EDUCATION

*Article by Ralph E. Turner and Hope Sewell French*

### NETHERLANDS INDIES: INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE

*Article by Amry Vandenbosch*

PERIODICAL ROOM  
GENERAL LIBRARY  
UNIV. OF MICH.



# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. XI • No. 282



PUBLICATION 2217

November 19, 1944

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Information, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest is included.*

*Publications of the Department, cumulative lists of which are published at the end of each quarter, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.*

*The BULLETIN, published with the approval of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., to whom all purchase orders, with accompanying remittance, should be sent. The subscription price is \$2.75 a year; a single copy is 10 cents.*

# Contents

AMERICAN REPUBLICS	Page
Wheat Shipments to Bolivia From the United States . . .	596
Discussions by Cuban and United States Commissions . .	609
AUSTRALASIA	
Presentation of Letters of Credence by the Minister of Australia . . . . .	614
EUROPE	
Albania's Struggle for Freedom: Statement by the Acting Secretary of State . . . . .	591
Anniversary of the Founding of the Soviet Union: Message of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State . . . . .	595
Detention by German Government of Persons Claiming American Citizenship . . . . .	595
Declaration Concerning Czechoslovak Army . . . . .	596
Welfare of American Citizens in Rumania . . . . .	596
Present Ordeal of the Netherlands . . . . .	609
FAR EAST	
Netherlands Indies: Internal Political Structure. Article by Amry Vandebosch . . . . .	605
NEAR EAST	
Transfer of Representation of American Interests in Greece to the American Embassy . . . . .	596
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS	
The Allied Blockade. Article by John V. Lovitt . . . . .	597
The Proclaimed List . . . . .	609
An Integrated Post-War Economic Program: Address by Charles P. Taft . . . . .	610
GENERAL	
American-Soviet Friendship Day Rally:	
Message From the President . . . . .	589
Remarks by the Acting Secretary of State . . . . .	589
Treatment of Axis War Criminals . . . . .	591
POST-WAR MATTERS	
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals: Address by Edwin C. Wilson .	592
Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. Article by Ralph E. Turner and Hope Sewell French . . . . .	602
TREATY INFORMATION	
Protocol Supplementary to the Treaty With Mexico Relating to Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande . . . . .	616
Armistice Terms for Bulgaria: Corrigenda . . . . .	616
THE DEPARTMENT	
Inquiries on American Citizens in Certain Italian Districts .	595
Appointment of Officers . . . . .	616
Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs .	617
PUBLICATIONS . . . . .	618
LEGISLATION . . . . .	618

# American-Soviet Friendship Day Rally<sup>1</sup>

## MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT<sup>2</sup>

I am grateful to you and all those who are celebrating American-Soviet Friendship Day for the words of support and confidence I have received. There is no better tribute we can hold out to our Allies than to continue working in ever-growing accord to establish a peace that will endure. The

Dumbarton Oaks conference was a step in this direction. Other steps will be taken. In line with this objective such meetings as you are holding in Madison Square Garden and in other great centers throughout the United States are of tremendous assistance and value.

## REMARKS BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press November 16]

It is an honor for me to have this opportunity, afforded by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, to speak this evening of the close relationship existing between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The friendship between our two countries is a cherished heritage of our peoples. Our relations have grown close in the ordeal of this world-wide war, in which we have joined our efforts in a joint cause.

In our unity and in unity with our gallant Allies we have found invincible strength. The United Nations constitute the most gigantic combination of the forces of freedom ever known in the history of man. It is today relentlessly carrying the struggle against Hitler onto his own soil. We are fighting on his eastern, his western, his southern, and his northern approaches—on the land, on the sea, and in the air. Day by day, at this crucial time in the upward march of mankind, our peoples and our fighting forces are writing a new heroic story of courage, of unequalled labor, and of tremendous thrusts of righteous strength.

We are winning this war. Our victory will be complete. It will be a common victory, wrought by a common effort, won for the common good of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

To carry this struggle victoriously through to the day when the sound and the fury of battle

need be no more is our imperative job today. But there falls upon our countries, and upon all peace-loving countries, large and small, the sacred obligation to make sure that the victory shall lead to the establishment of secure and enduring peace.

The world may rest assured that whatever steps are necessary to prevent Germany from ever waging war again will be taken. Beyond that there is an even greater task.

There must be, and there will be, an organization of the peace-loving nations of the world bound together in mutual respect and in unswerving determination to keep the world's peace. War must not happen again. To put every ounce of determination and effort into the task of creating a peaceful and advancing community of free nations is an obligation which our two nations and all peace-loving nations cannot escape. This is the destiny of our friendship. It is the destiny of all the United Nations. We will not fail in this solemn trust.

<sup>1</sup> Meeting of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship in New York, N. Y., Nov. 16, 1944 on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram, which was read at the rally, was sent to the Honorable Joseph E. Davies, chairman, American-Soviet Friendship Day Ceremonial. Mr. Davies was former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union.



In a spirit of friendly collaboration and of mutual confidence and faith in each other we have taken the first necessary steps to establish an international organization to maintain peace and security. In that same spirit, we shall take further steps. We shall continue to act together and to work in fullest cooperation with those other peace-loving nations who share responsibility for building and guarding a peaceful world order.

For this high purpose, representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and later China, met at Dumbarton Oaks this autumn to prepare proposals for the essential machinery of such a world order. Building upon the foundations laid down at the Moscow Conference a year ago, they agreed upon proposals for the creation of arrangements for the immediate suppression of threats to international peace. Furthermore, they proposed arrangements for the constructive upbuilding of the economic and social conditions conducive to the advancement of human freedom and of human welfare and, therefore, to the promotion of peaceful relations among nations.

These proposals for meeting the great task of the future were immediately laid before the peoples of the world. You are discussing them as the governments are considering them. You are thinking about the questions on which proposals have yet to be formulated, as your governments are doing.

The Government and the people of the United States are firmly resolved that, so far as lies in their power, the work begun at the Moscow Conference and carried through its next stage at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting in Washington shall be carried on to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible. We are confident that the governments and peoples of the other United Nations are moved by the same resolution.

I have no doubt that in the coming months the Dumbarton Oaks proposals will be completed, that they will then be placed before a wider international conference as a basis of discussion, and that out of that conference there will emerge a charter of the future international organization which will be submitted to the nations for their final approval.

These are our next steps.

It gives me the greatest satisfaction to speak of the splendid attitude displayed in the Dumbarton

Oaks conversations by those fine public servants, Ambassador Gromyko and Lord Halifax, who are here tonight, and by their able associates. Their attitude was a faithful reflection of the spirit and broad vision of their Governments. That spirit and that vision will be manifest, you and I know, in the steps ahead.

Our great American statesman, Secretary Hull, has stated that the proposals now before the world represent the highest common denominator among the four participating Governments, rather than the plan of any one of them. They are the considered, though yet tentative, views of the countries which are bearing the brunt of the war and which inevitably will continue in the future to have special responsibilities for the prevention of wars and the removal of the fears that lead to wars.

The international cooperation shown at Dumbarton Oaks is immensely encouraging. In the words of President Roosevelt, "The task of planning the great design of security and peace has been well begun". It is another "clear indication", as Marshal Stalin said a few days ago, of "the stability of the front" of the United Nations.

Out of our common efforts for victory and for peace there is emerging a thought of surpassing importance. Nations *can* work together toward common ends. Of course, differences occur within and among nations. But there is abroad in the world today a greater conviction than ever before that whatever differences may arise among nations can and must be solved, peacefully and amicably, in a spirit of common understanding and goodwill, for the greater good of all.

That has always been true in the relations between our two countries. The interests and instincts of our peoples turn toward the peaceful and productive arts, the raising of great enterprises, the developing of public services, and the advancement of science and the humanities. Both our peoples have vast resources to develop, in different ways, for their own benefit and for the benefit of mankind. Both peoples are dedicated to the improvement of standards of living and the enlarging of opportunity for themselves and for all.

As we have fought and worked together, we have come to know each other better, and we have found that the cordiality of our relations has grown. Differences in points of view and method of work shrink as there is mutual knowledge and



NOVEMBER 19, 1944

591

understanding of each other's ways of thinking and of living. I am certain that we shall work out whatever problems confront us in full realization that the greatest goals of each of us must be the common goals of both of us.

We may look, ladies and gentlemen, to the future with confidence and trust.

We are all going through the kind of experience that led the heads of the Soviet, British, and United States Governments to say in the historic Tehran Declaration:

"We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations. . . . We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose."

My friend, Ambassador Gromyko, allow me, on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State, to convey to you and through you to the Government and the people of the Soviet Union the cordial and warm regard of the American people and its Government, our appreciation of the friendship which exists between us, and our confidence that there is in store for our nations, and for all the United Nations, a future of settled peace and a precious opportunity—such as the world has never known before—to advance the freedom and the well-being of all mankind.

## Treatment of Axis War Criminals

The following *aide-mémoire* is the reply by the Irish Government to the request of the United States Government that adequate measures be taken to insure that Axis war criminals do not find asylum in Eire:<sup>1</sup>

"One. The Irish Government note that the right to grant asylum is not in question and they feel that the United States Government will understand that the Irish Government can give no assurance which would preclude them from exercising that right should justice, charity or the honor or interest of the nation so require.

"Two. The Irish Government wish, moreover, to point to the absence of a comprehensive international code applicable to the subject matter of the request of the United States Government and to the lack of a generally recognized court or procedure for the judicial determination of individual cases.

"Three. On the other hand, since the present war began it has been the uniform practice of the Irish Government to deny admission to all aliens whose presence would be at variance with the policy of neutrality, or detrimental to the interests of the Irish people, or inconsistent with the desire of the Irish people to avoid injury to the interests of friendly states, and that when such aliens land they are deported to their countries of origin as soon as possible. It is not intended to alter this practice."

## Albania's Struggle for Freedom

### STATEMENT BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press November 15]

There are two or three resistance groups now fighting in Albania, and the Germans have been driven out of a major part of the country. There will be many problems facing the Albanian people because of the distress created by the occupation, resulting also in part from diverse traditions and cultural background.

This Government has not recognized any single one of the groups as an Albanian authority. However, we have repeatedly emphasized our traditional friendship for the Albanian people and our desire that their full independence shall be achieved.<sup>2</sup>

We expect that in laying the foundations for their regained independence these sturdy people will be guided by a spirit of mutual trust, tolerance, and cooperation in working out their political and social problems.

<sup>1</sup> This reply, which was made public by the Irish Legation in Washington on Nov. 15, 1944, was originally delivered to the American Minister at Dublin on Oct. 9. See BULLETIN of July 31, 1943, p. 62, and Oct. 1, 1944, p. 339.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1944, p. 315.

# Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

Address by EDWIN C. WILSON<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press November 14]

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN:

I regard it a privilege to be able to consider with you some features of the proposals for a general international organization which resulted from the recent conversations at Dumbarton Oaks. No group in this country could be more vitally interested in the success of this great effort than you, gentlemen, who are particularly concerned with the improvement of trade and commerce among the nations.

The primary objective of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals is the maintenance of international peace and security. This is a twofold objective. We will all readily agree that in any immediate situation when peace is threatened effective international machinery must be found in order to prevent, and if necessary suppress, threats or acts of aggression. Taking a longer perspective, I think we will also agree that constantly improving economic and social conditions in the various countries will help to create the conditions of stability and well-being on which peace and prosperity so largely depend. Your activity, therefore, can be of the utmost importance in helping to attain the high purposes which have been agreed upon by the representatives of the four nations at Dumbarton Oaks.

I venture to add, what may not always be so readily apparent, that the obverse proposition is also true, namely, that it is only under conditions of order and security that trade and commerce, both within and among nations, can be carried forward with reciprocal advantage. Very few business leaders will today assert that the gains sometimes stimulated by war are more than illusory. I feel certain, therefore, that all of us have a common interest in the principal objectives that

were sought at Dumbarton Oaks, and I believe also that the means proposed for attaining these objectives will merit your general support.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals have now been before the public for some weeks, and you gentlemen have had an opportunity of examining them in some detail. I need not, therefore, take your time in going through the proposals in any comprehensive way. They are, in any case, relatively simple and readily understood. You are also aware that several open questions were left for further consideration by the four governments with a view to reaching agreement upon them prior to the convening of a wider international conference for drawing up the basic instrument, or charter, of the proposed organization. Some of these questions pertain to voting procedures, to the elaboration or revision of the court statute, to providing for the termination or assimilation of some of the functions and responsibilities which were vested in the League of Nations, and to other problems of a similar character.

And may I add at this point that if agreement was not reached on all these questions in the relatively short time that was available at Dumbarton Oaks it was not because of any fundamental or insuperable differences which developed among the Delegations. All these questions, including the voting question, though difficult, are susceptible of solution, and the fine spirit of cooperation and accommodation which existed among the Delegations at Dumbarton Oaks gives a promise of complete agreement. To establish a general international organization of the scope and magnitude of the one proposed is no small task. The wide area of agreement which was reached was striking, and President Roosevelt himself referred with satisfaction to the fact that "so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time."

Now I would like to single out for your special consideration several of the principal features of these proposals which I think will be of special interest to you. First, I should like to mention the generally representative character of the proposed

<sup>1</sup> Delivered at the International Trade Luncheon sponsored by the Export Managers Club of New York in conjunction with the 25th Anniversary Conference on International Credit and Finance of the Foreign Credit Interchange Bureau of the National Association of Credit Men at New York on Nov. 14, 1944. Mr. Wilson is Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.

Organization. Five of the larger states will, of course, assume special responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security. This is only natural and even inevitable in the world where nations have such varying capacities. The position of these states in the Security Council, however, should not be regarded as one of *domination* but rather as one of *leadership* and *responsibility* for discharging certain duties which they alone, in view of their industrial and military potentials, are able to fulfil on behalf of the world community. But the Organization is to be open to all peace-loving states, large and small, and Secretary of State Hull has specially stressed this principle. A number of other states will be elected by the General Assembly to the Security Council, and although the voting procedure has not yet been finally determined, it is certain that any enforcement action by the Security Council would require the assent of some of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, in the General Assembly all states would be represented, and although the functions of the General Assembly, as we shall see, are not of the same character in the field of security, they are extremely important and far-reaching functions, particularly in the economic and social fields, which would have a very great bearing upon the peace and prosperity of the world. I believe you will agree, therefore, that the proposals, far from being in the nature of a great power alliance, are very definitely based upon the democratic principle.

In the second place, I should like to draw your attention briefly to the arrangements which are proposed for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for the maintenance or restoration of peace and security. There was much experience, some of it sad experience, to draw upon. The Delegations were fully aware of the disappointments and failures of the inter-war period, but they also were fully conscious of the type of organization which has proved to be so successful in winning the present war. Taking these streams of thought and experience as a point of departure, the proposals in a sense codify much that we have learned in these recent years. On the one hand, we now know that to be effective a security organization must be able to act promptly and effectively. Hence, it is provided that a relatively small Security Council of 11 members, including the large states as permanent members, should be given spe-

cial powers to act without being able to shift this responsibility to some other organ, like the General Assembly. The Security Council, of course, does not have such freedom of action that it could be arbitrary in the settlement of disputes or the enforcement of security. Its action must be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization as defined in the basic instrument. It would encourage states to settle their own disputes by peaceful means of their own choice and would intervene only when a situation or dispute actually got to the point where it threatened general peace and security. From that point the Security Council would, however, be empowered to act promptly and decisively and could call upon states to supply, on the basis of special agreements, the forces and facilities necessary to maintain the peace.

An international court of justice would be established as a principal organ of the Organization, and resort to judicial processes for the settlement of disputes would be facilitated and encouraged.

Profiting from the experience of this war, where the combined Chiefs of Staff have been able to plan the conduct of the war so successfully, it is provided—and this is a new feature—that a Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council should be charged with the duty of giving advice and assistance to the Security Council in carrying out its functions.

The Military Staff Committee would advise the Security Council on all questions relating to the Council's military requirements for the maintenance of peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to the regulation of armaments, and to possible disarmament. It would also be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at its disposal. From this description of its duties it will be clear that great care has been taken to provide an effective instrument for the enforcement of security. In addition to this, it is provided that in cases of emergency national air-force contingents should be held immediately available for combined international enforcement action.

It should also be noted that peaceful settlement of disputes would be encouraged as far as possible through regional agencies or arrangements, and that such regional agencies might be utilized to



assist the Security Council in carrying out enforcement action when it was authorized by the Security Council.

In these several ways the Dumbarton Oaks proposals go considerably farther than any previous plans while yet remaining within the limits of practical experience and political acceptability.

In the third place, I should like to emphasize another feature of the proposals which, I think, may touch more closely upon your own interest and experience. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals have elaborated a mechanism for facilitating and promoting the solution of international economic and social problems which is based upon the philosophy I referred to earlier, that wider economic opportunities and improved conditions of well-being will themselves, in a large degree, take away the occasion for resort to war. There may be international bandits who, obsessed by ideas of world domination, threaten the peace for reasons which are not connected with economic well-being. Such motives readily come to mind when we examine the avowed purposes of some of our present enemies. At the same time, nations which have access to raw materials and whose prosperity is based on trade and commerce are far less likely to launch upon destructive adventures.

This function of encouraging greater and more productive cooperation is entrusted especially to the General Assembly and under its authority to an Economic and Social Council of 18 states-members, which would be assisted by technical-expert commissions of an advisory character on a variety of subjects. The General Assembly would be expected to survey the whole field of economic policy and make recommendations which the Economic and Social Council would be expected to carry out. The latter body could, on its own initiative, make such recommendations to the governments or to the various specialized agencies working in these fields.

Among the specialized agencies now established or projected are such organizations as the International Labor Organization, whose purpose is to encourage the adoption by as many governments as possible of improved labor standards, with the result that the people of no country will be working at a disadvantage; the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, whose stated purpose is "to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to secure improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and

agricultural products . . . and to contribute toward an expanding world economy"; the International Monetary Fund, whose stated purposes are "to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment . . . to promote exchange stability . . . and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation"; an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a stated purpose of which is "to promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor . . .". Other specialized agencies and organizations are yet to be developed in related fields, such as transportation, aviation, communications, cultural relations, etc.

These specialized agencies would, of course, carry out their responsibilities as defined in their statutes or conventions, but it is deemed desirable that the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, at the highest political levels, should be able to consider and make recommendations on economic and social policies and activities which transcend the scope of any one specialized agency or even of any one government.

It is obvious that when such a wide variety of related activities are being carried on by these specialized agencies there will be need for some over-all body to consider and recommend ways and means for coordinating the policies of such related agencies to prevent overlapping and working at cross purposes. This is envisaged as the function of the General Assembly and, under its authority, of the Economic and Social Council. This Council would have the duty of receiving and considering reports from the economic, social, and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the general organization, and to coordinate their activities through consultation with and recommendations to such organizations or agencies. It should be understood that all these functions are on the plane of recommendatory action and are not executive in character.

All this field of activity is intended to facilitate private enterprise and development and, in those countries where economic enterprise is established on a different basis, to facilitate their eco-

economic relations with the rest of the world in the most mutually advantageous manner.

One of the stated purposes of the proposed general organization is "to afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends". It is a truism that the nations of the world today have become more than ever interdependent. Their industrial and economic life has become so complex and the economic and financial mechanism of nations has become so delicate that disturbances anywhere tend to have profound repercussions in other parts of the world. For this reason international collaboration has become a necessity, and if the Dumbarton Oaks proposals have not elaborated the machinery in greatest detail they have provided ways and means by which these problems can be dealt with in an orderly fashion and in the light of future experience. The proposals are a definite beginning and, I believe you will agree, a hopeful beginning, which opens up a vista of great possibilities for the future.

In closing, gentlemen, may I express the hope that there will be the widest possible study and discussion on these proposals and that you will give us the benefit of your knowledge and experience on these questions. The Government desires to move forward with the confidence which comes from the efforts of men who sincerely desire a world of stability and harmony within which the productive forces of the world can lead us to those higher levels of prosperity and well-being which are the rightful heritage of mankind.

## Inquiries on American Citizens In Certain Italian Districts

[Released to the press November 13]

The American Consulate at Rome is now prepared to receive inquiries and messages regarding the welfare and whereabouts of American citizens who are believed to be residing in the vicinity of Rome or Florence.<sup>1</sup> Communications should be addressed to the Department of State. However, the Department desires to emphasize that it can forward only those inquiries containing no messages unless the interested persons can show that they have been unsuccessful in attempting to communicate with American nationals in the Rome and Florence districts through regular mail channels.

For the time being this service is restricted to inquiries and communications which concern American nationals in or near Rome and Florence, in the Naples consular district, and in Sicily. Communications regarding aliens or persons who are not residing in these areas cannot be accepted.

## Anniversary of the Founding Of the Soviet Union

### MESSAGE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press November 17]

Accept, Mr. Stettinius, my sincere thanks to Mr. Hull and to you personally for the congratulations on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union. I express my firm conviction that the continuation of the cooperation established between our peoples in the days of war will be a most important factor in the preparation and safeguarding of a lasting and stable peace and the security of peoples.

V. MOLOTOV

## Detention by German Government of Persons Claiming American Citizenship

[Released to the press November 17]

The Department of State has received information which indicates that about 200 persons who claim the citizenship of the United States are being detained by the German Government in a camp at Bergen Belsen, near Hannover, Germany. As the German Government has thus far not allowed representatives of the Swiss Government entrusted with the protection of American interests in Germany or delegates of the International Red Cross to visit the camp at Bergen Belsen, the United States Government is without reliable information regarding the conditions there and the treatment being accorded to the persons detained at the camp. Accordingly, the Department is

<sup>1</sup> For inquiries on American citizens in Paris, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1944, p. 391.

### Declaration Concerning Czechoslovak Army

[Released to the press November 15]

In connection with recent German radio reports of the capture of General Viest, General Golian, and other Czechoslovak officers and soldiers in Slovakia, attention is again called to the declaration made by the United States Government on September 7, 1944 as printed in the BULLETIN on September 10, 1944, page 263.

making efforts through Swiss channels to obtain the names of the persons claiming American citizenship detained at the camp at Bergen Belsen and to arrange for their transfer to an internment camp where American citizens are accorded by the German Government the rights to which they are entitled under existing international agreements and practices.

In order that the Department may assemble as much information as possible in this matter, persons having information indicating that specific individuals with valid claims to American citizenship are detained at Bergen Belsen are requested to provide the Department with such information as they may possess.

### Wheat Shipments to Bolivia From the United States

[Released to the press November 14]

With reference to the press release by the Bolivian Government stating that the Government of the United States had provided wheat to make up deficiencies resulting from a reduction in wheat shipments to Bolivia by Argentina, the Department of State issued the following statement:

The Bolivian Government appealed to the United States for assistance in meeting the shortage of bread with which its people were faced as a consequence of Argentina's action when the Farrell government last month abruptly notified the Government of Bolivia that, beginning immediately, wheat shipments from Argentina to Bolivia would be reduced by 50 percent.

In its press release the Bolivian Government stated that the failure to receive the expected Ar-

gentine shipments resulted from a dislocation of rail transport partly attributable to Argentine Army maneuvers.

The Government of the United States, recognizing the character of the emergency thus created, took immediate action to furnish a large shipment of wheat to Bolivia and to make it available to the Bolivian people at the price that had prevailed locally. The action of the United States in this emergency is in accord with the spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance that prevails among the American republics which are cooperating in the prosecution of the war.

### Welfare of American Citizens In Rumania

[Released to the press November 13]

The Department of State has received information from a newly arrived American representative in Bucharest, Rumania, that American citizens living in Rumania are apparently well and unharmed. This representative, Roy M. Melbourne, a Foreign Service officer, is a member of the staff of the American representative in Rumania, Burton Y. Berry, who has just arrived in Rumania for the protection of American interests. Mr. Melbourne bases his report on personal interviews with individual Americans in Bucharest and on statements of the Swiss Legation hitherto in charge of American interests in Rumania.

As soon as it may be possible for interested persons in the United States to communicate either directly or through the Department of State with their friends or relatives in Rumania the Department will make a further announcement.

### Transfer of Representation of American Interests in Greece To the American Embassy

[Released to the press November 17]

The Department of State has been informed by the American Ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, now in Athens, Greece, that the representation of American interests in Greece has been transferred by the Swiss Government to the American Embassy. Mr. MacVeagh states that the Embassy has been established at No. 2 Queen Sofia Boulevard.



# The Allied Blockade

By JOHN V. LOVITT<sup>1</sup>

Lord Nathan in opening the debate on economic warfare in the House of Lords on May 9, 1944 spoke of the blockade of the first World War as a factor that "quite certainly made it possible for us to win", and in the same debate Lord Selborne, the Minister of Economic Warfare, referred to the fact that after the last war the Germans publicly ascribed their defeat to the blockade. They may have exaggerated its effect in order to preserve the illusion of an invincible army. In the present struggle time has been on our side in developing the blockade into one of the most effective instruments of economic warfare.

## I. THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF THE BLOCKADE

The object of a blockade is to keep an enemy from receiving supplies either directly or indirectly through neutral territory, thereby reducing neutral aid to the enemy's war effort.

Enforcement of the Allied blockade ultimately depends upon sea power. Since the Germans had access to the whole Atlantic seaboard after 1940, a diversion from operations of sufficient naval units to visit and search all ships on the high seas would have been impossible. Enforcement therefore shifted from the high seas to control at the source.

To accomplish this shift it was first necessary to control as much tonnage as possible. Neutral tonnage was chartered. If charters were not obtainable, Allied control over bunkering and insurance facilities was relied upon to prevent ship movements except on terms satisfactory to blockade authorities. A large measure of control over essential commodities was attained through the negotiation of a series of over-all contracts with producing countries for the purchase of exportable surpluses of strategic materials. If these contracts could not be made, preclusive purchases would have to be resorted to.

To supplement control over shipping and sources of supply a "financial blockade" was instituted by the blocking of foreign accounts and by permitting their use only for innocent transactions. The enemy was prevented to a large extent from ac-

quiring foreign exchange because all exports from European neutrals were required to be covered by certificates of origin and interest.

Finally the aid which the enemy received directly from a neutral was progressively reduced through the application of the "blacklist" and through the negotiation of war trade agreements.

Firms in neutral countries that traded with the enemy were blacklisted. Such an action, in effect, cut off such firms from supplies through the blockade and from all trade and communications with nationals subject to our jurisdiction. With the announcements in April and September 1944 that the blacklist would be carried into the post-war period, and with increasing Allied military successes, this weapon became most effective. The mere threat of being put on the blacklist induced neutral firms to enter into "undertakings" to eliminate or curtail exports to the enemy. Firms already on the lists took similar action in order to obtain their deletion from the lists.

The most delicate phase of this program was the negotiation of war trade agreements with the European neutrals. To carry out the program the United States relied on control of supplies from overseas and, in special circumstances, the threat of blacklisting. This control was supplemented by moral and political approaches which gained significance as the war progressed. The more important enemy needs were ball bearings and iron ore from Sweden, precision tools and arms from Switzerland, chrome from Turkey, and wolfram (tungsten) from the Iberian Peninsula. These exports became increasingly important to the German war machine as shortages developed in Axis territory as a result of bombing. Complete elimination—or drastic reductions—in these exports to the enemy has now been brought about.

<sup>1</sup>Mr. Lovitt, Adviser, War Areas Economic Division, and Chief of Section on Blockade and the European Neutrals, Office of Wartime Economic Affairs, Department of State, represented the Department in negotiations of war trade agreements with the European neutrals in London, and he is chairman of the Washington Navicert Committee.

The scope of the blockade has surpassed previous attempts; the use of effective controls operating at the source has made visit and search on the high seas practically unnecessary. These controls centered in a technique known as the "navicert system", the elaboration of which is one of the most ingenious developments of the war.

## II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVICERT SYSTEM

### *The Legal Basis of the Blockade*

Although the present Allied blockade in fact is the most extensive in history, in law it is an extension of the belligerent right to seize contraband rather than a "blockade". The right of neutrals to trade with belligerents and the right of belligerents to seize contraband coexist in international law. The development of those rights has had a stormy political and legal history. As a great maritime power, England emphasized the rights of belligerents at sea. Great land powers, such as Germany, opposed any extension of those rights. While it was a neutral in the last war the United States was the outstanding champion of the rights of neutral trade.

Before an article can be classified as contraband it must be susceptible of belligerent use and must have an enemy destination. According to Grotius the three classes of goods are absolute contraband, conditional contraband, and non-contraband. The first class consists of goods of use primarily in war, such as munitions, and is subject to seizure if destined to enemy countries. The second class includes articles that are useful alike in peace or war, such as coal or alcohol. These are subject to seizure only if destined to enemy forces, to enemy bases, or to an enemy government department. The last class, which once embraced such commodities as textiles, hides, wool, and silk, includes today only tobacco and medical supplies.

The length of the list of absolute contraband has grown in proportion to the tremendous expansion of the number of articles susceptible of "military use". The distinction between goods destined for the military and goods intended for the civilian population is largely obliterated because of the complete control exercised by the Axis governments over the distribution of practically all commodities. Conditional contraband therefore in practice is assimilated to absolute contraband. Thus all goods having an enemy

destination with the exception of tobacco and medical supplies are liable to seizure as contraband.

Proof of direct shipment to enemy territory is not necessary in order to meet the requirement of "enemy destination". Under the doctrine of continuous voyage it is sufficient to show only that the ultimate destination is "enemy" even though the ostensible destination is "neutral territory". Direct proof of ultimate "enemy destination" is rarely possible. The Prize Court, however, will entertain a presumption of "enemy destination" if a neutral lying adjacent to enemy territory imports a commodity greatly in excess of its normal requirements.

### *Origin of the Navicert System*

In exercising his rights with respect to contraband a belligerent has the right to divert a ship to one of his ports for examination and for possible adjudication.

During the period of American neutrality in the last war American shippers to Scandinavian ports complained loudly of the inconvenience and delays incident to the exercise of this right of contraband detention. R. P. Skinner, at that time American Consul General in London, suggested that such inconvenience could be avoided if the British would issue a type of passport that would permit innocent cargoes to travel through the blockade. That suggestion was adopted. The shipper thereupon submitted an application, which contained full particulars of the proposed cargo, to the British Embassy in Washington. If the British were satisfied that the consignment was unobjectionable under military regulations the Embassy issued letters of assurance to the shipper which facilitated the passage of his cargo through the blockade. From the code word used to designate them, those letters of assurance became known as "navicerts".

### *The Voluntary System*

By November 1939 navicerts were available, but their use was entirely voluntary on the part of the shippers. Their obvious convenience, however, soon resulted in the system's general acceptance, and then unnavicerted goods could be viewed with suspicion, which while in itself not justifying seizure might result in indefinite detention proving very costly to the shippers.

In addition to the navicert covering cargoes a ship's navicert was available. This would not be granted unless all items of cargo were navicerted. Without a ship's navicert the ship and her unnavicerted cargo might be detained, and even the navicerted cargo might be held up pending forwarding facilities. In his own interest, therefore, a shipowner would not carry unnavicerted goods, and a shipper would not entrust his cargo to an unnavicerted ship. It thus became unlikely that unnavicerted goods would be shipped at all.

This position was reached about the spring of 1940. It was, however, still a voluntary system, and had neutrals generally refused to apply for navicerts the system could not have been enforced because indiscriminate seizure of goods merely because they were unnavicerted would involve heavy damages.

### The "Compulsory" System

The Reprisal Order-in-Council of July 31, 1940 met that weakness and placed the system on a legal basis. The order established a legal presumption that all unnavicerted goods were going to the enemy and that all unnavicerted ships were carrying contraband; this order made both ship and cargo subject to seizure and removed the liability of the captor for damages upon subsequent release of the goods. The practical effect of the order was to make navicerts compulsory. Since the Prize Court administers international law, the Order-in-Council must have a basis in the law of nations. This basis is found in the right of retaliation against Axis violations of neutrality and against atrocities committed on the high seas.

The sanctions of the navicert system are not only legal but economic as well. The most powerful practical sanction is based upon control of bunkers, supplies, and insurance facilities. These were denied to all except navicerted ships.

As a supplemental precaution ship's masters were required to give an undertaking that no unnavicerted cargo was being carried, and they were required to obtain declarations relating to passengers, crew, and their personal baggage. These undertakings were required in connection with the ship's navicert and the ship's warrant which permitted the ship access to available commercial shipping facilities under British or American control. Holders of ship's warrants could not take a seaman on the blacklist as a member of the

crew. This restriction afforded some control over leakages and smuggling.

### III. CONTROL OVER NEUTRAL IMPORTS

With the development of the navicert system it became possible to "ration" the European neutrals. Blockade quotas of all important commodities were established for Spain, Portugal and her colonies (excluding Portuguese East and West Africa), Sweden, and Switzerland. For Turkey and Eire estimates of requirements took the place of formal quotas. These quotas were based generally on normal requirements for internal consumption, but various considerations, such as enemy deficiencies, were given weight. Quotas were reviewed periodically to allow for changes in internal production, estimate of future crops, development of substitutes, and alternative sources of supply. Navicerts would be refused unless the proposed shipment was within the quota. Quotas were not fixed for every conceivable import. Where there were no formal quotas navicerts were granted or refused largely as a matter of discretion on an *ad hoc* basis with reference to minimum requirements.

Reference has already been made to the blacklists of firms in neutral countries. Firms might be placed on the lists either because they were in part enemy owned or dominated or because they assisted the enemy through their exports or indulged in Nazi propaganda or engaged in pro-Nazi activities. The British list was known as the Statutory List; the American was called the Proclaimed List. The British and American lists came to be virtually identical.

The requirement of international law that contraband must have an enemy destination was not met merely by showing that the consignee was on the blacklist or, in other words, was an "enemy by specification" only. The prevailing view is that proof must go further and show that the consignee is in fact enemy controlled or dominated. Thus cargoes consigned to a firm which was on the blacklist solely because of undesirable political activity could not be condemned in the Prize Court. It was, nevertheless, desirable to bring pressure on such a firm and to add sanctions to the blacklist generally. Navicerts were therefore refused if either the consignor or consignee was on the blacklist.



Exports from the United States to the European neutrals and certain other selected designations (Portuguese Atlantic colonies, Portuguese Guinea, Spanish Atlantic islands, Spanish Morocco, and Tangier) were controlled by export licenses issued by the Foreign Economic Administration, but these licenses were referred to the Anglo-American Blockade Committee in London for quota and consignee clearance. Exports from the United Kingdom and the British Dominions and Colonies were similarly controlled by export licenses issued by the Board of Trade and similarly cleared for blockade consideration.

Certain refinements in the navicert procedure should be mentioned for the sake of completeness. Where it was essential to control the "end use" of an import into neutral Europe the consignee instead of the consignor applied for the pass—in this case called a "blockade control permit" instead of a navicert. Lists of goods subject to this "inverted procedure" were established principally for Sweden and Switzerland. This procedure simplified investigation of consignee uses.

Another refinement in procedure related to navicert applications covering commodities in short supply coming from Latin America. These were referred to Washington before being acted upon in London. It was naturally to our interest to conserve such commodities, but where, for instance, the proposed shipment was within a blockade quota established by a war trade agreement with the European neutral of destination, the Blockade Committee took the view that there was no proper basis for refusing the application. The Washington Committee was often able to justify refusal on the basis of an agreement with the exporting country reserving the entire exportable surplus of the commodity involved or through diplomatic approaches prevent the issuance of an export license by the country of origin. The more important Latin American commodities in short supply and covered by over-all contracts were: Cinchona bark (quinine), sisal, mica, rubber, industrial diamonds, lead, zinc, tin, copper, cobalt, nickel, platinum, and tungsten. Germany is particularly short in the steel alloys.

As an additional precaution, in many cases before granting a navicert the Blockade Committee would insist that the consignee give a guaranty against reexport.

As the list of scarce commodities lengthened with the progress of the war and most commodi-

ties became subject to allocations it became more difficult for the neutrals to obtain supplies to fill their blockade quotas. They were therefore willing to forego a large portion of their quotas in return for an assurance of supply in smaller amounts, or "basic rations". These assurances implied an actual allocation by combined supply authorities. This system was notably invoked in the case of Sweden.

#### IV. CONTROL OVER NEUTRAL EXPORTS

Of almost as much importance as the control of imports into neutral territory giving access to the enemy was the destruction of enemy export trade, thus disabling him from obtaining foreign exchange with which to purchase supplies, carry on propaganda, or otherwise advance his war efforts from the outside. This, however, presented a legal difficulty: The Declaration of Paris established the principle that the neutral flag covered enemy goods (except contraband), and so by shipping through neutral countries and on neutral ships enemy goods might escape capture.

The Order-in-Council of July 31, 1940, based on the right of retaliation, again came to the rescue. This order established a presumption that goods shipped from any port from which goods of enemy origin or ownership might have been shipped are of enemy origin and ownership and liable to condemnation unless covered by a "certificate of origin and interest" issued by a British consul upon evidence that the goods are free from such enemy taint. No neutral ship could carry non-certificated cargoes and obtain a ship's navicert.

In order to accommodate industries in neutral European countries forced to rely to some extent on Axis countries for raw materials or parts, an enemy content of five percent by value of labor or material was permitted. In the case of Switzerland an enemy content of 25 percent was allowed, partly in recognition of the character of her manufactures and limited resources of industrial raw materials and partly in consideration of certain financial arrangements by virtue of which Swiss francs were made available to the Allied treasuries.

If the enemy content of a neutral export exceeded the permitted percentage, but if the article was nevertheless required to fill British or American needs, the export could still be made under an "export pass" issued by the Enemy Exports Section of the Blockade Committee. Swiss bolting-

cloth is a case in point. This cloth is made from Italian silk, the enemy content of which is therefore above that permitted. It is used in flour-milling and certain wartime processes. Export passes accordingly were issued freely to cover this material, for which there apparently is no substitute.

# V. THE BLOCKADE COMMITTEE

The enforcement of the blockade centers in the Blockade Committee, which meets daily in Berkeley Square House, the quarters of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. When the United States Government commenced participation in the Blockade Committee shortly after Pearl Harbor it was agreed that the two governments would have equal voice in the decisions of the Committee and its subcommittee regardless of navicert representation.

The Blockade Committee is presided over by Lord Finlay, a distinguished justice of the High Court. It functions in three sections, the Contraband, Permits, and Enemy Exports Sections.

The Contraband Section determines whether there is a *prima facie* case for seizure of a ship or cargo and passes on all navicert questions which cannot be decided by the navicert committees of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. It acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Lord Finlay is chairman, and with him sit representatives of the American Embassy, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, the Procurator General's Office, and the Black List Section of the Ministry.

The Permits Section fixes the blockade quotas within which the neutrals are permitted to import through the blockade. Its chairman is Lord Farrer, the head of the Information and Procurement Department of the Ministry. He sits with representatives of the Ministry in charge of neutral trade and representatives of the American Embassy.

The Enemy Exports Section has charge of the granting of "certificates of origin and interest" and "export passes" where the enemy content exceeds five percent (25 percent in the case of Switzerland). Lord Finlay is chairman and is assisted by representatives of the American Embassy, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, and various Departments of the Ministry.

The Blockade Committee sits as a whole to decide general matters of blockade policy and to

consider difficult questions which arise in the different sections.

# VI. THE NAVICERT COMMITTEES

By far the majority of cases are decided in the daily meetings of the navicert committees on lines clearly laid down by the Blockade Committee. There is a committee for each of the European neutrals within the navicert area. The committee consists of representatives of the Neutral Trade Section of the Ministry whose work has to do with the particular neutral, a representative of the Black List Section of the Ministry, a representative of the Navicert Subsection, and a representative of the American Embassy. The navicert committee decides all cases which do not warrant consideration by the Blockade Committee. For instance, this committee would approve or reject the application if the quota is "open" or "closed", provided in the former instance that the blacklist representative confirms that the status of the parties is "white". Where necessary, approval is made subject to the receipt of a guaranty from the consignee that the goods will be used in a satisfactory manner.

The decisions of the navicert committees are referred to the Navicert Subsection for necessary action—that is, to request a guaranty or to notify the decision to the post which referred the application. Cases which the committees cannot decide are presented to the Blockade Committee.

The Navicert Subsection is the secretariat for the whole navicert system. The traffic officer of the Subsection receives the telegraphed particulars of an application for a navicert from the field. He distributes them to the proper geographic group, where the application is "journalized" and entered on the agenda for the daily committee meeting. At meetings the representative of the Subsection acts as secretary of the navicert committee and reports any decisions. The Section then proceeds to carry out the decision, to make the proper entries in the register, and subsequently to check against manifests of actual shipment.

# VII. THE CONTROL FINALLY ACHIEVED THROUGH THE NAVICERT SYSTEM

Offered originally as a convenience to a neutral shipper as an alternate to the delays incident to contraband detention, the navicert system de-

(Continued on page 615)

## Conference of Allied Ministers of Education

By RALPH E. TURNER and HOPE SEWELL FRENCH<sup>1</sup>

IN THE autumn of 1942 the Ministers of Education of the governments temporarily located in London were called together by the British Council, the agency of the British Government responsible for cultural relations with other countries. In order to cooperate in studying and planning for the reestablishment of normal cultural and educational life in the occupied countries, a decision was made to form the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. From the beginning the Conference was composed of representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Great Britain. The British Minister of Education, R. A. Butler, became chairman of the Conference. Early in the life of the organization observers were sent to it by China, India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the four British Dominions.

The Ministers of Education of the occupied countries are concerned with the problems which will confront them upon the return of their governments. The work of the Conference, which has shown a spirit of cooperation on questions of common concern, has been focused very sharply on these practical problems. This group has not given consideration to the question of control and reform of education in enemy countries; nor has the Conference been disposed to attempt any control of education in the participating countries.

The Department of State has carefully weighed the interest of the United States in this problem of educational rehabilitation. It was felt that the loss of educational facilities in liberated areas and the death of scientists and teachers in those countries would produce intellectual and social conditions which unavoidably would tend toward internal disorder and external difficulties and that these losses would create new threats to the economic and political stability of the world. The

Department of State concluded that the participation of the United States Government in an international program to provide assistance to liberated countries in reestablishing their essential educational and cultural facilities would be an important service to world security and hence to our national interest.<sup>2</sup>

The Conference of Allied Ministers of Education in London has been concerned primarily with plans for securing materials which will make it possible for the liberated European countries to reopen their schools and universities. Elementary schools will need rudimentary supplies such as desks, pens, pencils, paper, slates, and books. Universities and higher technical institutions whose libraries have been destroyed will need books, and they will have to secure publications which have appeared since the outbreak of the war. Scientific and laboratory equipment will be required to instruct students in engineering and medicine in order that they may join effectively in the reconstruction of their countries. New teachers must be trained and former ones retrained. All these problems and others have been studied by the Conference.

As to the financing of this reconstruction program, it should be pointed out that certain of the countries will bear the entire cost themselves; other countries whose educational facilities and economic life have been extensively destroyed will require assistance in some form. The plan of giving assistance has not been finally determined.

One of the earliest-established commissions of the Conference is the Commission on Basic Scholastic Equipment. Its members have considered the basic needs for the reopening of schools in liberated countries. If children are to return to a normal life and are to take their places in schools once again after five years of Nazi disruption basic materials will have to be supplied; pens, pencils, slates, paper, textbooks, and many other items will be needed. The Commission, therefore, has defined a minimum standard unit for estimating need and has considered various ways by which this need can be met.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Turner was formerly Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Cooperation, Office of Public Information, Department of State. Miss French is Cultural Relations Reporter, American Embassy, London.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 1, 1944, p. 299.



The Commission on Scientific and Laboratory Equipment has made considerable headway in obtaining information and in making estimates for the vast reconstruction needs in the scientific field. The whole range of scientific and laboratory equipment used in education for trade and craft schools as well as technical and professional colleges and research institutions must be estimated and supplied. The index of various kinds of equipment required will list approximately 10,000 items.

An important factor in the replacement of scientific equipment is the desire on the part of European countries not to become dependent again upon German sources of supply, since experience has shown them that dependence on the use of German scientific apparatus involves a dependence upon German education, technical services, and industry. Consequently American and British industries will probably receive from European countries large initial orders for scientific equipment.

One of the most active commissions is the one on books and periodicals. It has undertaken to perform a dual function: first, to obtain books and periodicals published since the outbreak of the war for the libraries of the devastated countries, and second, to encourage the production of certain books, especially in the field of history, for general educational use by the member nations. The Books and Periodicals Commission has under way projects for restoring libraries by the salvaging of books from British libraries and from other stocks and by securing contributions from the public through a book drive. It is hoped that the drive will secure a million copies.

Another project is the building-up of a book pool, which now consists of about 2,000 copies of the best books published in England since 1939 and of nearly 400 British periodicals. It is proposed to furnish to each devastated country one set of these books. Each country may purchase further sets with its own funds. A building to house this rapidly increasing collection has recently been made available in London by the British Government. An Inter-Allied Book Center Committee has been created to take charge of this work.

It should be added that these preliminary undertakings are not thought to be adequate to restore fully the libraries of Europe which have been destroyed. The American Library Association

and other bodies in the United States are working on collections of books published in this country to supplement the British project. An inclusive program for the restoration of library facilities in war-torn countries has not yet been planned.

The Commission on Films and Visual Aids has undertaken to prepare the framework for an increased use of radio and motion pictures and other aural and visual aids in the schools of post-war Europe. Although these aids were used to a limited extent in European schools before the war, the Ministers of Education of the various countries are interested in modernizing and extending their school systems.

The need for teaching personnel in the liberated countries is a serious one, since thousands of teachers and scientists have been killed or broken in health by the Nazis. For the past five years no new generations of teachers have been trained in some of the countries. Consequently the Ministers of Education at the Conference in London have been acutely concerned with this teacher-training problem. During the war Czechs and Poles and other nationals in very limited numbers from the armed services have been receiving higher education in Britain; interned Polish soldiers in Switzerland have also been receiving university training.

The Conference has had no special commission to deal with this teacher problem. Each nation has considered its own internal program and has explored the possibilities of securing assistance in the less devastated countries. Pending the development of the national educational institutions the institutions in Great Britain and the United States will be the principal source of aid in training. The devastated countries are emphatic in their refusal to continue sending students to Germany for university, professional, or technical education. Most of the countries, as soon as they have restored standards of higher education, would like to have American students come to their universities.

Besides the restitution of libraries there is the vast problem of recovering and restoring to their rightful owners objects of art and archives looted by the Axis from European museums, art galleries, and archives. The Conference is investigating this problem through its Commission on the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Materials. Both in the United States, through the American Commis-

sion for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (generally known as the Roberts Commission), and in Great Britain, through various private bodies and the Conference Commission, private research work has been in progress for some time on the location of looted art objects, archival materials, rare manuscripts, and precious books. In May 1944 the British set up an official advisory body, the Macmillan Committee, which is the counterpart of the American Roberts Commission.

The information gathered by the Commission and the results of its deliberations are to be held available for the agencies which will have to carry out the terms of the peace.

The Commissions mentioned are only a part of the machinery of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education; they make exploratory studies and recommend action. Decisions on action and policy, however, must be made by two higher units: the Conference body itself and the Inter-Allied Bureau. The Conference meets every two months with a full complement of delegates and observers. The Inter-Allied Bureau, the executive arm created in the autumn of 1943, has only 11 representatives. It is based on group representation with the principle of rotation determining its members. The smaller western European nations—Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway—form Group A with two representatives. The smaller eastern European nations—Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia—constitute Group B with two representatives. The English-speaking dominions and India form Group C with one representative. Group D, with one representative, is designated for the Allied states of Central and South America, which at present do not take part in the Conference. China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States are accorded one representative each. In the original plan for the Conference the Soviet Union, China, and the United States did not take membership in the Conference.

In May 1943 the American Embassy in London sent to the Conference and Commission meetings observers, who in turn reported to the Department of State. Since that time the United States Government has shown a steadily increasing interest.<sup>3</sup> In the autumn of 1943 it sent to London for two

months Ralph Turner of the Department of State as an official observer.

On April 1, 1944 the American Education Delegation was sent to London to participate in discussions for expanding the scope of the Conference. The members of the Delegation were Congressman J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Delegation, the Honorable Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, Dr. John W. Studebaker, United States Commissioner of Education, Professor C. Mildred Thompson, Dean of Vassar College, and Dr. Ralph Turner and Dr. Grayson Kefauver of the Department of State.

Although the United States is not an official member of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education the American observers during 1943 and the Delegation in April 1944 have collaborated extensively with it; they have attended the meetings regularly and have carried on detailed conversations with both delegates and observers.

Since the American Delegation went to London last April the relationship of the United States has changed from that of observer to that of a cooperating nation participating actively in the deliberations of the Conference. Grayson Kefauver, a member of the original Delegation, has remained in London as continuing United States Delegate. In this capacity he has participated in the work of the various Commissions and has carried forward discussions with the Ministers of Education and their staffs concerning problems and plans for the reestablishment of normal educational and cultural life. He has also made studies regarding the plans for the United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction.

For a considerable period members and observers of the Conference discussed the necessity of turning the present body into a United Nations organization for educational and cultural reconstruction. Definite action was taken at the April meeting. A draft of a tentative plan for a United Nations agency was prepared which has been submitted to the 44 United and Associated Nations—including the United States—for study and comment. After it has been approved by as many as 20 countries the draft constitution will be reconsidered in the light of the amendments proposed by the agreeing nations and a final form agreed upon for submittal to the different governments for official action.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of May 13, 1944, p. 433.

The present draft states the reasons why international cooperation in educational reconstruction should be attempted; it defines the functions of the organization; and it indicates that membership shall be open to all the United and Associated Nations and to such other nations as shall be accepted by the Assembly after the close of hostilities.

Although this projected Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction would at first be concerned with the emergency work of restoring essential educational facilities and cultural institutions destroyed by the Axis powers, this experience would be expected to create a basis for lasting international cooperation in educational and cultural fields.

## Netherlands Indies: Internal Political Structure

By AMRY VANDENBOSCH<sup>1</sup>

### I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

*Central Government.* The Netherlands Indies Government has been headed by a Governor General appointed by the Crown and responsible to the Minister of Colonies and through him to the States General. The Governor General has possessed very great powers. Except for some positions which were filled by the Crown, his appointive powers were practically unlimited. He shared the legislative power with the *Volksraad*; when unable to obtain its approval for a measure he had, in case of emergency, the power to issue it in the form of an executive decree. Attached to the Governor General was the Council of the Indies, which was composed of five experienced administrators.<sup>2</sup> While the Council of the Indies still enjoyed much prestige, its actual influence had waned. The Governor General, although free to consult it on a number of specific subjects, required the concurrence of the Council in only a small number of matters. In recent years the directors of the administrative departments had come in large measure to replace the Council of the Indies as the advisers of the Governor General.

Exclusive of the chairman, the *Volksraad* had a membership of 60. Under the provisions of the Indies Government Act, 30 seats were reserved for Indonesians, 25 for Netherlands, and five for non-indigenous Asiatics. Ten of the Indonesian, ten of the Dutch, and two of the non-indigenous Asiatic seats were filled by appointment of the Governor General; the remaining seats were elective under a system of separate racial electorates, indirect voting, and proportional representation. The members of the local regency and municipal councils formed the electorates.

*Intermediate Government.* Before the creation of the provinces the Indies Government was highly centralized, but in the decade and a half after 1925 considerable progress was made in the creation of intermediate governments. Java was divided into three provinces: West Java (1926), East Java, including Madura (1929), and Central Java (1930). After several years of discussion and preparation the Outer Islands were finally (1938) organized into three "governments": Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East. The chief difference between a province and a "government" was that the latter did not yet have a representative body. At the head of both provinces and governments were governors, appointed by and responsible to the Governor General. With regard to purely provincial matters the governors of the provinces were responsible to the provincial council. The members of the provincial councils were chosen in the same manner as members of the *Volksraad*, and the seats were distributed among the racial groups in about the same ratios.

The Dutch used indirect rule wherever possible. In Java and Madura it was upon the regency, with the semi-hereditary regent at its head, and upon the four native states of Central Java, with their Javanese princes, that the superstructure of the Dutch administration was built. In the Outer Islands the native states had many forms but were for the most part petty sultanates.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Vandenbosch was formerly a Principal Divisional Assistant in the Far Eastern Unit, Division of Territorial Studies, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> For a few years in the early 1930's it was composed of seven members.



Sixty-two percent of the area of the Outer Islands, with a little less than one half of the population, was under indirect rule. In the Indies as a whole there were 278 native states, of which 223 had a population of less than 50,000, and two, both in Java, had a population of over 1,000,000. The native states had jurisdiction only over their own indigenous population.

*Local Government.* The provinces of Java were divided into regencies, about 70 in all, with semi-hereditary Javanese regents at their head. The population of the regencies varied from 500,000 to 1,000,000. Attached to each regency was a council in which the Indonesians had an overwhelming majority. In the Outer Islands the Indies Government was attempting to develop group communities as units of democratic government. The Minangkaba tribe of Sumatra was organized on these lines, and its council was regarded as a successful instrument of rule.

Because the cities contained a large European population and because most of their problems were technical in character, governments of urban municipalities were largely controlled by Europeans. The composition of the municipal council differed from that of the provincial and regency councils in that all its members were elective. All members of the municipal councils and also the European and non-indigenous Asiatic members of the other local councils were elected by direct vote of the eligible voters, while the Indonesian members of the regency councils and provincial councils were elected by indirect vote, each elector representing 500 voters.

All Indonesians who were Netherlands subjects, who were 21 years of age and were residents of the regency, and who paid a tax to the regency, province, or central government were eligible to vote. The qualifications for an elector were, in addition to the above, that he be at least 25 years of age, male, and able to read or write. Qualifications for municipal franchise were the same for all races, and were as follows: Dutch nationality; a minimum age of 21 years; ability to read and write Dutch, Malay, or the local language; residence within the city; and payment of income tax on an income of at least 300 florins a year.

*Racial Differentiation.* One notable feature of the Dutch policy in the Indies is the extent to which differentiation based upon race prevails. This distinction is most marked in the legal, edu-

cational, political, and administrative systems. Racial discrimination is not the object, for the Dutch in the Indies have been remarkably free from racial feeling. The policy was never consciously adopted; it just grew. In recent decades it has come increasingly under criticism. The justification most frequently advanced has been that the social needs of the different racial groups differ greatly and cannot be met by legislation applying to all groups alike. In the Indies Government Act and in Indies legislation the population was classified into three groups: Europeans, Indonesians, and non-indigenous Asiatics.

In education there has been differentiation at the base and unification at the top. There have been separate elementary schools for Europeans, Chinese, and Indonesians, in which the children have been taught in their mother tongue. Instruction in the intermediate schools and the higher professional schools was in Dutch; it was open to members of all races without discrimination. The Indonesians have remained under the customary law of their own ethnic group, unless they chose to assume the status of Europeans. For the other two main groups, however, a large measure of unification has been achieved. With the exception of criminal procedural law and some rules of family law, the Chinese have been assimilated to Europeans. However, there was the provision in the Organic Act that land could not be alienated to non-indigenous persons—a provision which has had profound consequences for the social and economic life of the country. Non-indigenous persons and corporations obtained use of the land necessary for their operations by long-time leases of public lands or by renting from the native peasants. Administrative positions were generally open to Dutch subjects regardless of race. An exception, however, was the highly important Department of Interior Administration, which was divided into a European and an Indonesian Corps, the two being kept quite distinct. In Java the European Corps was gradually being withdrawn from the lower branches of the services. The Indies population was likewise divided into the three main groups for electoral purposes. Each group was a separate electoral corps, and to each group a fixed number of seats in the representative bodies was assigned.

There was a great deal of criticism of the principle of racial differentiation. The Visman Com-

mission<sup>3</sup> found among all population groups an intense desire for the abolition of most of its forms. There was one important exception, however. Virtually all the natives who were questioned desired the retention of the present land laws which limit the ownership of land to native Indonesians. Drastic changes in respect to racial differentiation may be expected in the general constitutional and political reforms which are likely to occur after the liberation. Abolition of differentiation in the electoral function would, however, place minority groups at a decided disadvantage as opposed to the Indonesians, and members of these groups have therefore opposed it.

*Indonesian Participation in Administration.* Exclusive of persons employed by the hour, day, or month there was on October 1, 1938 a total of 73,354 employees of the central government. They were distributed among the various population groups as follows:

Racial groups	Number	Percent
Europeans .....	14,395	19.64
Indonesians .....	57,252	78.05
Assimilated Indonesians .....	789	1.07
Chinese .....	721	.98
Assimilated Chinese .....	174	.23
Other non-indigenous Asiatics .....	23	.03
Total .....	73,354	100.00

These figures do not include the employees of the local governments. In these positions the proportion of Indonesians is naturally much higher. Of the 14,395 European employees, about one half were recruited in the Netherlands; the other half were predominantly Eurasian.

Even more significant than the percentage of all the positions held is, of course, the type of position held by each population group, as indicated in the following table:

Racial groups	Lower personnel	Lower intermediate	Purely intermediate	Higher personnel
European .....	0.6	33.3	57.6	92.2
Indonesians .....	98.9	60.6	38.0	6.4
Assimilated Indonesians .....	0.2	3.4	2.0	0.5
Chinese .....	0.3	2.3	1.5	0.3
Assimilated Chinese .....		0.4	0.9	0.6
Total .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Lower administrative offices were filled almost exclusively by Indonesians; intermediate positions were shared by Indonesians and Eurasians; the lower intermediate positions were filled predomi-

nantly by Indonesians; and the purely intermediate predominately by Eurasians. The higher personnel is still overwhelmingly Dutch.

As a result of the late development of higher education in the Indies, few Indonesians were found in positions requiring college or professional training. In the decade from 1928 to 1938 the Indonesians had made considerable progress, but it is significant that aside from the important semi-hereditary position of regent the Indonesians had been entrusted with few highly responsible positions. Of the executive departments only one, the Department of Education, has had an Indonesian as director. One large city in Java—Bandung—has had an Indonesian mayor. Only in the last decade has an Indonesian been elevated to the Council of the Indies; in the last few years before 1941 two of its five members were Indonesians.

Indonesians frequently served on the Netherlands Delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations and to International Labor Conferences. One of the Netherlands representatives on the International Tin Committee was also Indonesian. After the Japanese occupation of the Indies an Indonesian was made a member of the Netherlands Cabinet in London as minister without portfolio (P. A. A. Soejono, who died on January 5, 1943).

*Indonesian Participation in Representative Bodies.* In the representative bodies the number of seats for each racial group was fixed by law. One half, or 30, of the seats in the *Volksraad* were reserved for Indonesians, five for non-indigenous Asiatics, and 25 for Netherlands. The seats in the provincial councils were distributed among the racial groups in practically the same proportion. In the regency councils the Indonesians had an overwhelming majority, since only a few seats were reserved for Europeans and Chinese. The urban municipalities were regarded primarily as European institutions and the control of them was definitely European.

## II. NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

### *Indonesian Nationalism*

Though the nationalist movement had made considerable headway after the establishment of

<sup>3</sup> A commission appointed by the Governor General in September 1940 to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of the Indies for governmental reforms. It issued its report just previous to the Japanese invasion.

the *Volksraad* in 1918, it was still young and immature in 1941 and had not yet penetrated deeply into native society. It was strongest in Java and in certain areas of Sumatra like the Minangkabau region. With the exception of a few centers (Minahassa in northeastern Celebes, Ambon, and Timor), Borneo and the Great East were untouched by it. Membership in Indonesian political organizations probably did not exceed 125,000. The party organizations were numerous and unstable; parties waxed and waned, joined forces, and fell apart in rapid succession. The immaturity of the nationalist movement was due to a number of factors, among which the following may be named: The relative geographic isolation of many of the numerous islands; the diversity of cultural development of the peoples of countries; the brief period in which large parts of the Indies have been under effective administrative control; the tardiness with which Western lower, and especially higher, education was introduced; the wide use of indirect rule; the legal, cultural, and political assimilation of the Eurasians with the Dutch; and the rigid Dutch control of political activity among the natives. Considering the initial handicaps it had to overcome, the nationalist movement had made truly remarkable progress, though it had not yet produced an outstanding leader.

#### *Chinese Groupings*

Relations between the Indonesians and the Chinese were not always of the most friendly character, chiefly for the reason that Indonesian laborers, small businessmen, and intellectuals met with severe competition from the numerous Chinese. The political loyalties of the Chinese were divided. One third of the Chinese were not born in the Indies, and among them were many coolies, who were politically indifferent. The politically conscious Chinese were divided into three groups. There was one group whose political interests were largely centered on China. Of the other two groups, which had turned their minds wholly to the Indies, one of them identified its interests with the Dutch and sought to maintain and promote the welfare of the Chinese in cooperation with the Europeans. A small third group of Chinese had been assimilated to the Indonesian population and made common cause with the Indonesian nationalists. The Arabs were divided in much the same way, except for the absence of an Arab coolie class.

#### *Indo-European Union*

The strongest and most homogeneous party in the Indies was the Indo-European Union. Nominally a party of all those who considered the Indies as their home, it was in fact the party of the Eurasians. Although very loyal to the Netherlands, it sharply opposed the Government on a number of issues. In the 1930's it became more critical of governmental policy and joined with the Indonesian nationalists in demanding greater autonomy for the Indies Government.

In the earlier days of the *Volksraad* "associationist parties", that is, parties seeking their membership among all racial groups, were fairly strong, but they declined with the rise of the nationalist movement. Where they have been held together by religious principles, as for example in the Christian Political Party and the Catholic Party, they have shown some degree of permanence.

#### III. IMPERIAL STATUS OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

In 1922 the term "colonies and possessions in other parts of the world" was removed from the Netherlands Constitution, and provision was made for giving the East Indies Government greater autonomy. In 1925 the Indies Government Act was revised to conform to the revised articles of the Constitution. While the Indies Government was granted a larger measure of autonomy, it was still far from achieving complete autonomy. The Governor General had charge of the general administration, but he exercised his functions in accordance with the directives of the Crown. Thus, the Governor General remained responsible for general policy to the Minister of Colonies, who in turn was responsible to the States General. The States General retained the right to legislate on all Indies matters. However, before legislating on any matter affecting the Indies it was required to consult the *Volksraad*. The annual budget of the Indies Government had to be approved by the States General, which also resolved budgetary deadlocks between the Governor General and the *Volksraad*.

The Crown enjoyed a wide power of appointment and removal. In addition to the Governor General and Lieutenant Governor General the Crown appointed the chairman of the *Volksraad*, the vice president and members of the Council of the Indies, the president of the High Court, the



commander in chief of the Indies Army, the commander in chief of the Navy in the Indies waters, and the chairman and members of the Auditing Office.

The Governor General was invested with very wide powers. Even after the reorganization the administrative system was highly centralized, and there was little constitutional check on the powers of the Governor General. After 1927 he shared the legislative power with the *Volksraad*, and deadlocks between the two were resolved in different ways. In case a bill sent to the *Volksraad* by the Governor General did not receive the concurrence of that body, the bill could be sent back to it for reconsideration, but such resubmission had to take place within six months of the rejection either by the Governor General or by the *Volksraad*. If still no agreement was reached, the regulation could be enacted by a general administrative order of the Crown. If the *Volksraad* failed to give its concurrence within a specified period to a bill sent in by the Governor General, and if circumstances demanded immediate action, the Governor General had power to issue ordinances under his own authority.

With the German invasion of the Netherlands the authority of the home government naturally declined and the actual authority of the Governor General increased, as opposed to that of the Crown; on the other hand, the necessity for cooperation between the Governor General and the *Volksraad* likewise increased. A much larger autonomy for the Indies Government resulted. The government in London tended rapidly to become an imperial rather than a national government. At the same time every phase of Indies society—cultural, economic, and educational—became more autonomous or independent. Beginning with the depression and continuing increasingly during the years of international tension, the various peoples of the Indies drew closer together.

#### IV. EFFECTS OF THE JAPANESE INVASION

What effects the Japanese occupation will have on political attitudes and political evolution in the Indies can be only a matter of conjecture. Only meager reports have come out of the Indies since the Japanese occupation. Because of lack of personnel the Japanese may be using Indonesians extensively in administrative positions, both in government and in commerce and industry, though

(Continued on page 613)

## Present Ordeal of the Netherlands

### MESSAGE FROM QUEEN WILHELMINA OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press November 15]

NOVEMBER 11, 1944.

I offer you my sincerest thanks for your very kind telegram and especially for your warm solicitude for The Netherlands in their present ordeal. The suffering of that part of the country which is not yet liberated is daily growing more and more terrible as winter sets in. I am most grateful to you for your active help in order that relief be brought with the least possible delay.

WILHELMINA

## Discussions by Cuban and United States Commissions

[Released to the press November 15]

Discussions of the Cuban and United States commissions on purchases by United States Government agencies of sugar, molasses, and alcohol from Cuba were resumed at the end of October. The conversations which followed were conducted in a spirit of mutual cooperation, and substantial progress was made toward reaching a satisfactory agreement.

The discussions have now been suspended, and the Cuban commission is going back to Cuba to inform the Government and the associations of *colonos* (cane-planters) and *hacendados* (mill-owners) about the negotiations.

## The Proclaimed List

[Released to the press November 19]

The Acting Secretary of State, acting in conjunction with the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Acting Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, on November 18 issued Cumulative Supplement 3 to Revision VIII of the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, promulgated September 13, 1944.

Part I of Cumulative Supplement 3 contains 37 additional listings in the other American republics and 160 deletions. Part II contains 84 additional listings outside the American republics and 62 deletions.

# An Integrated Post-War Economic Program

Address by CHARLES P. TAFT<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press November 14]

This Nation has during its 168 years been an object of interest to the Old World and for over 100 years to the Far East. But never before has it occupied such a strategic position in the world or more justified the title of a world power. For what do we use that power? That is the question.

We have just finished the greatest demonstration in the world's history of democracy in action, an election for President carried through in the midst of a life-and-death struggle for our continued existence. It is a true modern miracle that in a nation of 135 million people of every race and color a decision of greatest moment should be made in one way because three million more people voted that way, and twenty-one million people who were outvoted accepted the decision without the slightest question. We all closed ranks and marched on. We all know with what supreme interest the people of every nation watched that election. Do you think that this basic lesson of democracy was lost on their minds? Its reverberations will go down the centuries when Hitler and the crop he raised from his dragon's teeth are buried for good.

So I say again, What do we use this power for? Will the rest of our conduct toward the nations of the world destroy all the effects of this noble lesson in democratic political science?

We are not likely to damage our influence lastingly by aggression or by a lack of concern for the interest of people. We are if at all on the side of altruism in our political conduct. But we can do and have done great damage to neighbors around the world by our conduct in economic affairs. People react violently to the pocketbook nerve, whether they should or not, and if some act of ours means unemployment or even starvation to them one can hardly blame them.

Our contacts with foreign nations are innumerable, and all of them affect our foreign relations. But government is responsible, and within

our Government the Department of State is charged with the task of advising the President on foreign policy. That probably brings up in your minds a picture of diplomats in striped trousers and high hats, a picture both of the men and of their job which is wholly erroneous.

The Department of State has two main tasks. The first is the collection of information, accurate and complete information about foreign countries, both what the departments of government, and business people, and other private citizens want to know and also the information they should know. That is a reporting system, and it takes the majority of our Foreign Service staff to perform the reporting function. The Foreign Service is not the Foreign Service of the State Department; it is the Foreign Service of the United States and of all Government departments and all citizens. Its task in the field can become routine. Because the Department realizes that, it is seeking to maintain the standard and the imaginative understanding of these reporters. A special effort has been made in the last nine months to help this far-flung line of American representation.

The second task of the State Department in advising the President is to coordinate in Washington the foreign policy of the United States, based upon the information the Foreign Service has sent in by cable, by air, and by surface transportation. Foreign policy is a complicated matter, involving every product of the earth, every spot on the earth's surface, every kind of conduct of that fascinating and somewhat diverse animal, *homo sapiens*. Many agencies of government have direct responsibility for different parts of that policy, often with overlapping interests, and many others are responsible for domestic policies which have inevitable and far-reaching foreign repercussions. The different parts must be coordinated, especially with the many new agencies in wartime. In no field is that coordination more important than in the economic. Thus it is that much of the time of our economic offices in the State Department is taken with interdepartmental meetings in which we work with agencies to reach agreement on a United States policy.

<sup>1</sup> Delivered before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, at San Francisco on Nov. 14, 1944. Mr. Taft is Director, Office of Wartime Economic Affairs, Department of State.

That creates one of our difficulties. A mediator or conciliator can't advertise how he does it, or he opens up the very sores he has been at such pains to heal. But we have been working all the time toward a well-rounded and integrated total policy, and the time is coming when that policy will be stated in full in just those terms. In the meantime I shall try today to give you a quick review of the more important economic policies we have been putting together.

The International Labor Organization is the principal inheritance from the League of Nations. Its long, successful life will develop further with the peace. In the meantime the clarification of the boundaries of the interests of the International Labor Organization in relation to the many new or proposed international organizations takes careful thinking. In a nation with high standards of living and a high level of industrialization, nothing can be more important than the promotion of similarly high standards elsewhere, as fast as they can reasonably be expected.

The first United Nations conference was that on food and agriculture at Hot Springs. It followed up the work of the International Labor Organization in promoting standards and increasing supplies of food of adequate nutritional value, along with an even more difficult task, the promotion of good food habits. The way Puerto Ricans, surrounded by waters teeming with fish, eat salt fish from Newfoundland illustrates the point.

Then came the conference on displaced persons, which set up the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons. It is expected that when the war ends seven to nine millions of foreigners will be in Germany and two million Germans outside Germany who want to return home. Add any populations who should be moved when territorial settlements are made, the millions of Chinese refugees, and all the other prisoners of war and internees, and add too the stateless of whom there then will be a tragic total, and you have the most heart-rending problem of all.

Bretton Woods was a most successful effort to tackle the twin problems of exchange and the financing of reconstruction upon which so much of the world's progress at the end of the war depends. We have had oil conferences, rubber conversations, talks on war shipping problems, and now a full-dress conference on aviation at Chicago.

Finally came the Dumbarton Oaks conference on the basic problem of world security with the resulting draft charter on which such universal approval has developed. The charter is important in the field of economic foreign policy, for it proposes an Economic and Social Council made up of 18 expert members elected by the world assembly. Not much has been said about this council in the discussions on the World Security Organization, but it represents a great step forward from the League organization. No longer can the basic economic problems be obscured by political excitement, for they will have a forum of their own made up of representatives directly concerned with and skilled in handling them.

Into this pattern will fit the Bank and Fund, the I.L.O., the Food Organization, any business practice, commercial policy, or commodity organization that may develop, any health and welfare activities, and any other appropriate international cooperation in these fields of economic and social policy.

All of this is procedural and organizational and not very exciting, I am afraid. I have reviewed it because I wanted you to see that the State Department has been bringing together the thinking of all the Government agencies and the best ideas of most voluntary and business groups in a total pattern that fits together. It is not as perfect as a completed picture puzzle, but it is completely different in fact from the confusion charged by critics of our Department and of our foreign policy. The extent of the accomplishment is measured further when you look at the number of agencies concerned. In the first place there are the war agencies: The FEA, the WPB, the War Food Administration, and the War Shipping Administration; then the regular departments: Treasury, War and Navy, Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, Labor, the Tariff Commission, Justice, Federal Security. Every problem has many points on which it may frequently be difficult to get agreed positions within the State Department or any other individual agency. To get different agencies with differing approaches to agree is always a tough job. That is the coordinating function of the Department of State. Some of us who occupy executive positions in the Department are not really experts in economics or foreign affairs in any professional sense, although we are rated by the Department and the Civil Service Commission as professionals. We really need to be co-



ordinators, conciliators, experts in human nature and in politics.

Last April the President set up the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy—with my chief, Dean Acheson, as chairman—which has on it representatives of all the long-time agencies, and the rest are called in on matters which affect them. Problems and solutions that come up through its various subcommittees are thrashed out and cleared and then go directly to the Secretary and to the President for approval. Continuous contact and clearance with appropriate congressional committees is of course necessary, but that is handled by the Department itself.

Let me put all this on a more practical basis. My office is concerned among other things with the elimination of wartime controls and restoration of normal trade as rapidly as possible. We run into two kinds of situations. In the first place, suppose we want to help exporters who want to sell goods in Syria and the Lebanon or Egypt. Of course shipping is very tight, but apart from that the three countries have no dollars to pay us with. They have sterling balances in London, and francs in Paris, but the British and French are very low on their dollars, too, and won't trade their dollars for sterling. The only way we could work it out would be to buy more goods in England or France, which could trade the dollars they get for the sterling or francs they owe to the Middle East (a three-way trade), or to buy more goods in the Middle East, which gives them dollars direct to buy our goods (a two-way trade), or to lend them dollars to buy our goods (which really means to lend them our goods).

The second kind of problem in restoration of trade arises with places like China, Italy, or Greece. At this stage such nations have an economy which has almost completely run down and stopped. They have no dollars, no sterling, and at the beginning they have nothing to offer in exchange in kind, or almost nothing. Then you have no alternative but to find a way to help them get the materials that go into their export goods and to lend them the money to carry them until they can go it alone. Otherwise there is chaos that helps no one and may damage us all.

The Bank and Fund were designed to meet these two kinds of situations. They don't do it wholly, and neither are they strictly orthodox. But the situation is hardly orthodox, and the Bank and

Fund are well thought out to do the job that needs to be done. The storm of criticism that greeted them from bankers has gradually calmed, and many individuals have pulled down their storm signals, come out of their storm cellars, and gladly or grudgingly given their approval.

There is a place for direct U.S. financing, both public and private. Congressmen on both sides of the House have proposed an expansion of the lending authority of the very well run Export-Import Bank and removal of the restriction on its lending to the European countries. Such a measure ought to be passed. The Johnson act stops any private lending in many of the countries that need it and could get it. We are the world's creditor nation, and what we need is not the isolationism of a policy of no loans but the development of the skills of a creditor nation. We deserved such ill-will as we got in the twenties and thirties, not because we justified the title Uncle Shylock—we didn't—but because we were a creditor nation with the mentality of a debtor, and because we did not acquire enough know-how of foreign investment.

A similar isolationism both here and in Britain has advocated locking up our industrial skills and machinery and has condemned promoting the industrialization of backward countries on the ground that it takes away our markets. That is the old-time mercantilist philosophy, which lost to Great Britain the American Continent 170 years ago. Britain disproved the whole theory and so did we in the nineteenth century. The higher the standard of living in China or India the better market for our goods and the better the chance for this lively strip of West Coast to hold on to its industrial production for export by sea.

But those projects will mean little if after we help solve the problems of finance and exchange the other nations stick with state trading and a tight self-sufficiency. Along that line lie despair and frustration. We can manage this job with one state-trading nation, but we hope we will not have to do it with more. That means that our State Department must take the lead in coordinating the steady and persistent presentation to all trading nations, especially to France, Great Britain, and China, of intelligent programs of commercial policy which take into account the difficult and varying situations of each.

Two problems at once arise which produce diametrically opposed views of policy. Cartels are anathema to American opinion generally, being simply another version of the trusts we have been condemning for 50 years domestically. When, in addition, the cartel was used as an instrument of Nazi domination, there is no wonder that we will not traffic with these private international agreements to limit supply artificially.

But on the other hand there are some products, agricultural and mineral, for which the standard rules of economics don't work. When certain agricultural prices go down, farmers, instead of planting less and adjusting supply to demand, plant more in order to get just as much cash income. Then you get the unmanageable surpluses. When a country depends entirely on one or a few agricultural or mineral products, a fall in demand or price brings disaster to an entire economy and people, in a way that in modern times we cannot permit. The resulting revolution is likely always to damage our political objectives, too. The Committee has reached a conclusion which is carefully worked out to meet the situation.

One of the great accomplishments of this youthful Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy has been to reconcile these opposing viewpoints and come up with agreed policies which form part of this total program of the United States abroad.

I would be less than frank, however, if I did not say in passing that the most serious dangers to our own foreign trade—but far more important, to the objective we all seek, a prosperous world—are some of the theories widely held for sustaining certain farm prices at an exaggerated level, and certain other programs which might develop later, whose purpose is to maintain domestic employment by various kinds of trade controls and subsidies.

That is the field in which the State Department is working shoulder to shoulder, and effectively, with all the other agencies concerned. Its reorganization 10 months ago was not just a surface shuffling but was a real streamlining. The streamlining is not for its own greater glory but to serve this Nation in its foreign relations. No function is more important to our future as a nation. It is not a partisan function. Mr. Hull has been determined to keep foreign policy out of partisan politics. He has succeeded to an extraor-

dinary degree, and his Department is for that very reason a real cross-section of American geographical and political manpower. It can give you confidence in the future representation of your country abroad in those fields of economic activity which are not, I believe, decisive in fixing our future but which are nevertheless of the greatest importance to our ideal of a cooperative world in which people may live with true satisfaction. Let us use this tremendous American power and prestige not for temporary present benefits but for lasting policies in the economic field that help maintain peace.

---

VANDENBOSCH—Continued from page 609

according to early reports Japanese "economic" experts were swarming the country and were displacing the Dutch officials.

Because of the economic dislocations and the destruction accompanying the invasion there undoubtedly is much suffering among all classes and races. This suffering should bring the various racial groups closer together. On the other hand, secondary and higher education are suffering. This factor will inevitably retard social development, while the problems of reconstruction will be extremely difficult and will require much technical skill and political leadership. But a consequence of the experiences since 1937 must be a greatly lessened dependence upon the Netherlands, an increased fluidity in Indonesian society, and a much larger share in the economic, political, and educational life of the country by the Indonesians. There is no reason to believe that the pre-invasion trends will be retarded, though possibly they may be deflected.

Indonesianization of the services will be accelerated, the cultural and political autonomy of Indonesia will go steadily forward, but the nationalist movement will in all probability shift its emphasis from dominion status or independence to imperial partnership. The Dutch and Eurasians in the Indies will probably shift their position; instead of forming the spearhead of Dutch authority in the Indies they may take over the leadership of one section—the pro-empire section—of the nationalist party. Much will depend upon the skill with which the Netherlands Government carries out its broad promises of political reforms and upon the ability of the Dutch and Eurasians in adapting themselves to these reforms.

## Presentation of Letters of Credence by the Minister of Australia

[Released to the press November 14]

The remarks of the newly appointed Minister of Australia, Sir Frederic William Eggleston, upon the occasion of the presentation of his letters of credence, November 14, follow:

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

It gives me great pleasure to hand to you today letters by which His Majesty the King accredits me as his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary with the especial object of representing in the United States of America the interests of the Commonwealth of Australia. In tendering my letters of credence, and also letters of recall of my predecessor, Sir Owen Dixon, K.C.M.G., I desire to express on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and also on behalf of the Australian people sincere good wishes for your personal welfare and for the continued prosperity of the Nation whose destinies you have guided during a period of unparalleled difficulty.

When my predecessor presented his letters of credence some two and a half years ago the situation in the Pacific was still dark, although my countrymen had been greatly encouraged by the successful naval action in the Coral Sea. Since that time brilliant action in the Pacific has turned the tide of battle so decisively that even the rulers of Japan must now regret the treacherous blow at Pearl Harbor. I desire to extend to you, Mr. President, the congratulations of the Australian people on the success which has attended the recent landings in the Philippines and the remarkable naval victory which followed upon these landings. These give no greater satisfaction to the people of the Philippines and the American people than they do to the people of Australia.

Before Pearl Harbor, Australian land, sea, and air forces were dispersed throughout the world and gave no mean account of themselves in land battles in Africa, Greece, Crete, and Syria, in sea warfare in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, and in the skies over Europe. When Japan attacked and Australia was in imminent danger it was necessary to concentrate some of these forces in the Southwest Pacific area to defend the Australian homeland. Now that the period of acute danger to Australia is over, Australia is deter-

mined to contribute her due share in bringing to other countries the security which she now enjoys. The participation of the Australian Naval Squadron and also of certain specialist Australian Army units in the Philippine landings is a significant step in this direction.

I need hardly assure you, Mr. President, that during my term of office I shall do my utmost to maintain the close and friendly bonds between the United States and Australia which the mutual trials of the present war have done so much to strengthen. Australia will never forget the help given to her by the United States during the period of peril through which she has just passed. With such a basis for friendly understanding it should not be a difficult task to find ways and means by which the peoples of the United States and of Australia can come to understand one another more and more fully, and I feel sure that any problems which arise for consideration can be solved in an atmosphere of mutual good-will.

The organized forces of the United States of America, using to the full the resources of science, have shown to a conspicuous degree a genius for war. But the people of the United States have to an even greater degree a genius for peace, and we in Australia hope to be able to cooperate with the United States, the British Commonwealth, and all the United Nations in establishing a peaceful order based on law and on recognition of the rights and responsibilities of nations.

The Australian people realize that it is necessary to maintain an all-out war effort if victory in the Pacific is to be assured for the United Nations. I feel no doubt, Mr. President, that the people of the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia will both meet the requirements of the present situation and demonstrate their unflagging determination to face whatever hardships may still lie ahead in order to secure for future generations the right to enjoy liberty and pursue happiness free from fear.

President Roosevelt's reply to the remarks of Sir Frederic William Eggleston follows:

**MR. MINISTER:**

I am happy to welcome you to Washington and to receive from your hands the letters which ac-



credit you as His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary with the special object of representing in the United States of America the interests of the Commonwealth of Australia. I likewise accept the letters of recall of your distinguished predecessor, Sir Owen Dixon, whose outstanding service in this Capital will long and happily be remembered.

I deeply appreciate the earnest good wishes which you have brought from the Government and people of Australia. I am glad to have this opportunity to give expression once again to the feeling of warm friendship which the American people have for the people of Australia and for the entire British Commonwealth of Nations.

Here in the United States we have a special admiration for Australia. Our peoples have common ideals of liberty and justice. We are neighbors in the Pacific. We have faced and are facing the same treacherous and ruthless enemy. Not alone for their own sakes but for the sake of humanity itself do our two nations share the heavy sacrifices of war. Difficult days still lie ahead, but we may take increased courage from the fact that our efforts and those of all our great Allies are now not unattended with success.

It moves me deeply to be able to accept from you the congratulations of the Australian people upon the results of the recent events in the Philippines and in Philippine waters. We in this country will never forget the glorious part Australia has played in driving back and destroying the power of the aggressors. It is a cause for special gratification that Australian and American forces have continued the heroic advance upon the enemy side by side, and that Australians were with us as we returned to the Philippines.

Ultimate victory, both in Europe and in the Far East, is in sight. Together the United Nations have largely solved the problems of waging war. Without for a moment diminishing our war effort we must at the same time begin to organize the peace. The people of the United States fervently hope and expect that the bonds which the trials of war have forged between themselves and the peoples of Australia, of the rest of the British Commonwealth, and of all the other United Nations will endure and form the sinews of an enduring peace based upon law and respect for the rights of all peoples. The United States espe-

cially looks forward to a mutually beneficial co-operation with Australia in the Pacific.

I hope that your stay in Washington will be pleasant, and I wish to assure you that the officials of the American Government stand ready to help you in every possible way to carry out your duties as Minister.

---

**LOVITT**—Continued from page 601

veloped into a complete control of neutral trade. No import of a commodity would be navicerted if it exceeded the quota or if either the consignor or consignee were objectionable. Even the "end use" within the neutral country was controlled if desirable. Exports were similarly rigidly controlled.

If it be said that this control goes far beyond the right to condemn contraband, the answer is that the navicert is a "facility" which we may grant or withhold. In theory a neutral exporter is at liberty to ship without a navicert and if his cargo is in fact not contraband the Prize Court could not condemn. Through control over bunkering and insurance facilities the shipment can, however, be prevented.

As the war progressed the system in some instances became an instrument of policy. All navicerts to Switzerland, for instance, were refused in April 1943 because the Swiss in their trade negotiations with Germany had revived credits which had expired and had increased their exports of war materials to the Axis. In the case of Spain and Portugal navicerts were refused in order to enforce provisions against reexport and to speed the negotiation of a war trade agreement. The use of the navicert system for purposes of policy in these instances can be amply defended on the ground that we were merely denying a "facility" which carried with it the use of our own resources to keep the enemy from receiving increasing aid from a neutral.

Great care is taken, on the other hand, not to use the system arbitrarily. Navicerts are not withheld solely because a commodity is in short supply, even if it would have been to our interest to prevent shipment with a view to purchasing it ourselves.

A fine sense of fair play, together with the Anglo-American dislike of the arbitrary, prevails in the administration of the system which ultimately has paid big dividends.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Protocol Supplementary to the Treaty With Mexico Relating to Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande

[Released to the press November 14]

On November 14, 1944 there was signed in Washington by the Honorable Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Acting Secretary of State, and His Excellency Señor Dr. Don Francisco Castillo Nájera, Mexican Ambassador in Washington, a protocol supplementary to the treaty between the United States and Mexico relating to the utilization of the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) which was signed in Washington on February 3, 1944.<sup>1</sup>

The substantive provisions of the protocol are contained in two paragraphs. The purpose of the protocol is to clarify certain provisions of the treaty respecting the functions and jurisdiction of the respective sections of the International Boundary and Water Commission, as provided for by the treaty.

By its own terms the protocol is made an integral part of the treaty, to become effective when the treaty becomes effective and to remain in force for the duration of the treaty. The treaty was transmitted to the Senate with the President's message of February 15, 1944, with a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof.

### Armistice Terms for Bulgaria

#### CORRIGENDA

To conform to additional data received in the Department regarding the armistice terms for Bulgaria, the following changes should be made in the text as printed in the BULLETIN of October 29, 1944:

Page 492, first column, third paragraph, seventh line: Delete "the" before the word "Soviet".

ARTICLE ONE (A): First line: Insert comma after "Bulgaria"; third line: delete comma after

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 5, 1944, p. 161, and Mar. 25, 1944, p. 282.

"September 9"; fourth line: delete comma after "September 6"; fifth line: change "hostilities has ceased" to read "has ceased hostilities".

ARTICLE ONE (B): Third line: Begin new paragraph with second sentence.

ARTICLE FOUR: Fifth line: Delete comma after "war" and in lieu thereof insert "and"; sixth line: insert comma after "internees" and delete first "and".

ARTICLE SEVEN: Seventh line: Delete "the".

ARTICLE EIGHT: Second line: Delete comma after "periodical".

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN: Sixth line: Change "fuels" to read "fuel".

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN: Eighth line: Begin new paragraph with second sentence.

Page 494, first column, third line: Delete comma after "quadruplicate"; fourth line: insert the word "languages" after "Bulgarian".

Page 494, first column: Reverse the order of signatures of Marshal F. I. Tolbukhin and Lieutenant General James Gammell.

Page 494, second column, second line: Delete comma after "services"; third line: change "Governments" to "governments"; sixth line: Insert "the" after the second "in".

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Appointment of Officers

Louis F. Thompson as Acting Chief, Accounts Branch, Division of Budget and Finance, effective November 2, 1944.

H. Merrell Benninghoff as Executive Officer, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, effective September 1, 1944.

Bryan J. Hovde, Chief of the Division of Cultural Cooperation, has been designated to represent the Department of State on the Policy Board of the National Indian Institute, established by Executive Order 8930 of November 1, 1941 in the Department of the Interior, effective November 1, 1944.

Daniel H. Buchanan as Consultant in the Division of Commercial Policy, effective October 16, 1944.

## Division of International Labor, Social And Health Affairs<sup>1</sup>

*Purpose.* In order to reflect the full range of responsibilities vested in the Division of Labor Relations by Departmental Order 1218 of January 18, 1944, it is desirable to change the name of the Division, and, for purposes of clarification, to outline its main functions.

*1 Change of name of the Division of Labor Relations.* The name of the Division of Labor Relations, Office of Economic Affairs, is hereby changed to the Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs.

*2 Functions of the Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs.* The Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs is responsible for the following major functions and related activities:

(a) Analysis and making recommendations on the effects of labor developments in foreign countries on the foreign policies of those countries, on international relations, and on the foreign policy of the United States.

(b) In collaboration with the Office of the Foreign Service, selection, training and direction of the work of the economic analysts attached to United States missions to report on labor and related matters.

(c) Analysis and interpretation of reports on labor and related matters received from labor reporting officers attached to United States missions for use in the Department in policy determination.

(d) Study and advice regarding the effects of international economic policies and activities of the United States, of international organizations or agencies, and of foreign governments, on employment, wages and standards of living in the United States.

(e) Analysis of policies regarding labor and of conditions of employment in this and other countries as they affect foreign policy or are affected thereby.

(f) Development of policies and recommendations regarding international measures to promote full employment and the improvement of labor standards and advising on economic measures related to these ends.

(g) Development of policies and recommendations regarding the foreign policy aspects of the

migration and settlement of persons, including post-war aspects of wartime displacements.

(h) Maintenance of liaison with labor, social and health organizations in the United States, both public and private, on labor, social and health matters which affect or are affected by United States foreign policy.

(i) In collaboration with the Division of International Conferences, development of policies, formulation of recommendations, and maintenance of liaison on labor, social, and health matters relating to the operations of international organizations in those fields.

(j) Study and advise the Department on international labor and social movements as they affect the foreign policy of the United States.

(k) Coordination of the policy of the Department regarding importation of foreign labor into the United States.

(l) Analysis and formulation of the Department's policy regarding international narcotics control and performance of the various duties imposed by statutes and arising from treaty obligations in matters relating to international cooperation in the suppression of the abuse of narcotic drugs.

(m) Development of policy regarding labor, social, and health matters in liberated areas and in ex-enemy territories, in collaboration with other Divisions of the Department and other agencies of the Government.

(n) Analysis and clearance for the Department of overseas programs of other Federal agencies relating to labor, social and health affairs.

(o) Maintenance of liaison with other Federal agencies concerned with problems of labor, social and health nature.

*3 Amendment of DO 1218.* Departmental Order 1218, January 15, 1944, (p. 20)<sup>2</sup> is hereby amended to include this amplification of the description of functions of the Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs.

*4 Routing symbol.* The routing symbol of the Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs shall be ILH.

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.

Acting Secretary

<sup>1</sup> Departmental Order 1298, dated and effective Nov. 10, 1944.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1944, p. 53.



## LEGISLATION

**Cartels and National Security:** Report from the Subcommittee on War Mobilization to the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, pursuant to S.Res. 107, a resolution authorizing a study of the possibilities of better mobilizing the national resources of the United States. November 13, 1944. Part I, Findings and Recommendations, 78th Cong., 2d sess., S. Subcommittee Report 4. v, 14 pp.

**Supplemental Estimates of Appropriations and Draft of Proposed Provision Pertaining to an Appropriation for the Department of State:** Communication from the President of the United States transmitting supplemental estimates of appropriations for the fiscal year 1945, amounting to \$825,000, and a draft of a proposed provision pertaining to an appropriation for the Department of State. 78th Cong., 2d sess., H.Doc. 760. 4 pp.

**Supplemental Estimate for the Appropriation "Foreign-Service Pay Adjustment, Appreciation of Foreign Currencies, 1945":** Communication from the President of the United States transmitting supplemental estimate for the appropriation "Foreign Service Pay Adjustment, Appreciation of Foreign Currencies, 1945," amounting to \$200,000. 78th Cong., 2d sess., H.Doc. 749. 2 pp.

## PUBLICATIONS

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Naval Mission:** Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia continuing in effect the agreement of November 23, 1938 as modified by the supplementary agreement of August 30, 1941, and extended by the agreement of September 22 and November 5, 1942 and further extended by the agreement of July 23 and August 7,

1943—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Washington June 26 and July 18, 1944; effective November 23, 1944. Executive Agreement Series 413. Publication 2201. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Detail of Military Officer To Serve as Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama:** Agreement between the United States of America and Panama continuing in effect the agreement of July 7, 1942 as extended by the agreement of July 6 and August 5, 1943—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Washington April 26 and May 18, 1944; effective July 7, 1944. Executive Agreement Series 414. Publication 2202. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Fur Seals:** Agreement between the United States of America and Canada—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Washington December 8 and 19, 1942; effective from June 1, 1942. Executive Agreement Series 415. Publication 2203. 8 pp. 5¢.

**Payment for Certain Defense Installations:** Agreement between the United States of America and Canada—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Washington June 23 and 27, 1944. Executive Agreement Series 405. Publication 2206. 6 pp. 5¢.

### OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The articles listed below will be found in the November 18 issue of the Department of Commerce publication entitled *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Electronics in Australia: Local Production and Markets for Imports", by Perry Ellis, vice consul, American Consulate General, Sydney, Australia, and Ralph H. Hunt, vice consul, American Consulate, Melbourne, Australia.

"Nicaragua's Trade in Local Chemicals", by Roland H. Brownlee, Jr., junior economic analyst, American Embassy, Managua, Nicaragua.

"Processed Milk in Peru", by Eugene G. Christin, junior economic analyst, American Embassy, Lima, Peru.